The building block that these heuristics have in common is reliance on the actions of the majority of one's peers as a guide to appropriate behavior and decision making. Indeed, imitating, copying, and benefiting from the opinions, attitudes, appearance, or-more generally-the behavior of others is one important form of bounded rationality (Simon, 1982) in the social world.
Heuristics in a Social World
Research on bounded rationality aims to describe how decision-making agents in the real world arrive at their inferences, choices, and decisions given realistic amounts of time, information, and computational resources. The vision of bounded rationality espoused in this book speaks in terms of models of simple heuristics; the research (p.5) program grounded in this vision was laid out in Simple Heuristics That Make Us Smart (Gigerenzer, Todd, & the ABC Research Group, 1999) . We advance this program by exploring simple heuristics for making decisions in specifically social environments-that is, environments in which humans and other animals compete with others for myriad resources such as food, mates, esteem, or affection, and in which rivals grant the decision maker little time for deep thought, protracted information search, or complex calculations. The social world, however, also encompasses environments in which others teach us how to deal with a fickle and unstable natural world that inflicts unforeseeable hazards, diseases, and famines; environments in which people forge alliances, cooperate with each other, and work in groups to boost their chances of success; and environments in which people dare to trust others and enforce fair play. In such a complex social world, Homo sapiens can be seen, according to the thesis of the present book, as a Homo heuristicus (Gigerenzer, Hertwig, & Pachur, 2011) , a species that relies heavily on appropriate simple heuristics to get the job of making decisions done.
Many definitions of heuristics have been proposed (for an overview, see Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011) . Here we adopt the following definition:
A heuristic is a strategy that ignores part of the information, with the goal of making decisions more quickly, frugally, and/or accurately than more complex methods. (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011, p. 454) Heuristics thus depart from classic notions of rationality in economics, psychology and other fields, in which rationality is typically equated with optimization (i.e., maximization or minimization) of some function. For illustration, let us review some key heuristics that have been proposed as being in the mind's adaptive toolbox (Gigerenzer et al., 1999) to aid decision making in a social world.
Learning from Others
When Harry Potter and the Deathly Hallows, the seventh and final volume of J. K. Rowling's fantasy series about the adventures of a boy wizard, was released in the United States in 2007, it sold 8.3 million copies in its first 24 hours on sale (Miller, 2007) . Was the last Harry Potter book that good? Perhaps it and the earlier six volumes were genuinely brilliant -despite the fact that eight publishers declined to publish the first volume, Harry Potter and the Philosopher's Stone (Watts, 2007) . But although success is at least partly determined by intrinsic quality, it is also possible that what people come to like depends very much on what they believe others like (Salganik, Dodds, & Watts, 2006) . In such a world, the (p.6) explanation for why a particular book becomes a hit may be as simple as this publisher's: "It sold well because lots of people bought it" (Watts, 2007) . Because social information is now being shared much more widely across virtual and actual borders than in the past, cultural artifacts such as books and movies can now "snowball" in popularity in ways they could not a century ago, turning cultural commerce into a collection of difficult-to-predict, winner-take-all markets (Frank & Cook, 1995; Salganik et al., 2006) . Tiny differences in performance or product quality translate into vast differences in payoff.
People appear to prefer to experience the same things as others do. What others like or dislike, however, is not only informative when we try to figure out what new clothes, book, mobile phone, or car to buy. People follow others' example in deciding whether to adopt environmentally friendly or "green" behavior (Goldstein, Cialdini, & Griskevicius, 2008) . Companies imitate one another's successful business models.
In the airline industry, for instance, British Airways launched Go, a low-cost airline that emulated Ryanair's no-frills model to compete in the budget air travel market (CasadesusMasanell & Zhu, 2011) . Even literary characters such as Robinson Crusoe are depicted as navigating a hostile, lonely environment-before Friday's arrival-by recalling others' behaviors and imitating it (Defoe, 1719 (Defoe, /1815 . In fact, the ability to imitate others is an elementary building block of human behavior. At just a few days old, babies already show signs of belonging to Homo imitans (Meltzoff, 1988) , imitating a range of facial gestures-such as an adult's tongue protrusion (Meltzoff & Moore, 1977) . The ability to imitate also appears key in children's developing understanding of other minds (Meltzoff & Williamson, 2010) . As teenagers and adults, we learn from others' behavior how to engage with tools, cultural artifacts, and technologies, as well as the gestures, postures, and behaviors that define culturally appropriate social interactions. Finally, behavioral mimicry has also been suggested as fostering emotional recognition and empathy (Stel & van Knippenberg, 2008) .
Others are arguably the most important source of a person's knowledge, so individual learning in isolation may be the exception to the rule. The human being, the quintessential social animal, is not alone in showing behavior that is strongly informed and shaped by that of others. Other animals also learn socially (e.g., Danchin, Giraldeau, Valone, & Wagner, 2004; Laland, Atton, & Webster, 2011) , acquiring knowledge from conspecifics (Kendal, Coolen, & Laland, 2009 ) about, for instance, the best timing, location, and strategies of foraging (e.g., Galef & Giraldeau, 2001) , about mate choice (White, 2004) , and about what other species to flee from (Griffin, 2004) .
(p.7) The paradigmatic simple heuristic that bets on the behavior of others works as follows (Richerson & Boyd, 2005) :
Imitate-the-majority heuristic: Determine the behavior (e.g., action, judgment, choice, decision, preference, or opinion) followed by the majority of those in your peer group and imitate it.
"Doing as the Romans do when in Rome" makes good sense under a wide range of conditions, but it should not be employed indiscriminately. The majority is not always right: Sometimes it tends toward extreme positions (Isenberg, 1986) ; sometimes people emulate undesirable and unhealthy behavior from their social network (e.g., overeating; Christakis & Fowler, 2007) ; and social information, although easy to acquire, can be less reliable, less accurate, and more outdated than personal information (Kendal et al., 2009 Bandura (1977) suggested that the "more costly and hazardous the possible mistakes, the heavier is the reliance on observational learning from competent examples" (p. 12).
Sharing With Others
Whether and how resources should be shared with others is a thorny problem for all social creatures. In humans, the sense of having received the "short end of the stick" can trigger powerful negative responses and emotions among strangers (de Quervain et al., 2004) , and also among family members, as the biblical story of Joseph attests:
Israel loved Joseph more than any of his other sons, since he was the child of his old age. Fehr, Bernhard, and Rockenbach (2008) recently showed that the tendency to share resources equitably with members of one's own social group appears to emerge in children as young as seven or eight years old. At this age, children strive for an equal distribution of food in situations in which they themselves both could claim a larger share or could hand a larger share to the other party. On the basis of these and other results, Tomasello and Warneken (2008) suggested that the proclivity to share equitably among all members of a group is "characteristic of individuals in the kinds of hunter-gatherer societies in which humans spent the vast majority of their evolutionary history, suggesting that this preference did indeed play an important part in the evolution of human cooperation" (p. 1057).
Another valuable property of the equity heuristic is that it permits those tasked with sharing a resource, such as parents, to justify their allocation decisions to all "stakeholders"; in a family, these include the squabbling children and possibly watchful grandparents. Moreover, the equity heuristic represents a simple distribution principle that has been proposed to require less information processing, memory, and effortful calculations than alternatives (e.g., Messick, 1993; Ohtsubo & Kameda, 1998, p. 91) . Notwithstanding its benefits, the equity heuristic does not guarantee equity in the aggregate, however-an issue we will return to later.
A Vision of Social Rationality
In this book, we present a vision of social rationality according to which much of reasoning and decision making in humans and animals can be modeled in terms of simple heuristics that neither search, weigh, and add all available information, nor make extensive use of computation to reach optimized solutions to the problems that these agents face. 
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Franklin apparently believed that the use of this decision tool is appropriate in many domains-not least in social ones. Indeed, he told a nephew, Jonathan Williams, of his to settle the question of whom to marry using moral algebra; otherwise, he remarked, "I apprehend you will never be married" (Franklin, 1779 (Franklin, /1970 The legitimacy of Dennett's criticism extends beyond philosophy. In his promotion of moral algebra, Franklin largely disregarded the fact that many problems in the social world do not afford us time to ponder the pros and cons of our choices. Similarly, many economists, psychologists, legal scholars, sociologists, behavioral ecologists, and cognitive scientists treat the constraints under which humans and other animals make decisions as negligible influences on whatever part of the cognitive machinery or cultural ecosystem they have been interested in.
In our view, the brute fact that we are all finite-with respect to our time, our information, and our processing powershould be the starting point of our theorizing. We do not claim that under realistic conditions less information and less computation (p.12) will be invariably better than more information and computation. As we already pointed out, the use of social learning strategies is adaptive under many, but not all, circumstances (Kendal et al., 2009) . Therefore, our goal in this volume is to investigate how, when, and why simple heuristics can make us smart in a social world that is inherently uncertain and complex, and how, when, and why they fail. Some would challenge-indeed, have challengedour vision of social rationality with the argument that simple heuristics are more likely than not to fail in social domains and that humans would have done better to evolve into a Homo deliberans than a Homo heuristicus. Let us take a closer look at this argument. In this argument, social environments are more complex than physical ones because, in them, strategies face counter-strategies, requiring individuals to become proactive interpreters of other agents-in particular, to build a model of others, a model of others' model of them (a "second-order" model), a model of others' secondorder model of them, and so on. Compounding this complexity (and the problem of infinite regress; see Elster, 1986 ) is the fact that such strategizing individuals cannot base their decisions merely on observable properties (e.g., a rival's body size, whereabouts, and available weapons) but must also consider information that is not immediately detectable in real time (e.g., the rival's alliances with others) or that may be impossible to gauge (e.g., the rival's intentions). Relatedly, in competitive interactions, individuals need to take account of the fact that information conveyed by others can be ambiguous, ephemeral, and even deceptive (Humphrey, 1988 (Humphrey, /1976 ; (p.14) Sterelny, 2003) , whereas nature, ever dispassionate and amoral, does not strive to outsmart them. Both these premises have been challenged. Gigerenzer (1997), for instance, argued that "complexity comparisons [between social and nonsocial environments] drive us into a conceptual cul-de-sac" (p. 267). One reason is that complexity is a vague term as applied to the social world. To the best of our knowledge, no measure of complexity has been proposed that would allow one to capture the degree of complexity of social and nonsocial environments and make meaningful comparisons between them. Another problem is that, however high or low an environment's complexity (assuming there is such a thing) is per se, not every species perceives and acts on that complexity. What matters is the perceived complexity (or the complexity of the organism's subjective ecology; see von
, which, in turn, is a function of the organism's cognitive and sensory machinery. The degree of perceived complexity can hardly explain why a particular level of (social) intelligence is observed in a species, because that perception depends on, or may even be an integral part of, the species' social intelligence.
Despite these objections, let us accept for the sake of the argument the premise that the social world is more complex than the physical world. Does mastering this complexity Let us briefly review the ground covered so far. Some have argued that the social world is more complex than the physical, nonsocial world, and that successful navigation of the social world therefore requires a high degree of cognitive complexity. In this view, simple heuristics simply will not do. As evidence consistent with this argument, proponents could refer to studies showing that, in primates, larger brains are associated with various proxies for a more complex social life. To do so, however, would be to stumble into a number of problems highlighted by Barrett, Henzi, and Rendall (2007) , of which we mention two. First, because large brain size is merely a proxy for cognitive complexity, it tells us little about the cognitive mechanisms that actually generate complex social behavior-for instance, whether they are simple heuristics (p.16) or computationally complex strategies.
Second, by locating social cognition exclusively in the mind, the equation of social and cognitive complexity overlooks the fact that particular structural regularities in the world can obviate or mitigate the need for complex cognitive processing. The latter argument is central to ecological rationality (Todd et al., 2012): Evolutionary, social, and individual learning can exploit informative environmental structures with specific simple strategies, giving an edge to a decision-making organism that employs those strategies (Todd, Hertwig, & Hoffrage, 2005) . This is not the only reason, however, why cognition in social environments may depend on simple heuristics. It could also be that there are no better alternatives.
Why Simple Heuristics Are Indispensable in a Complex Social World
In a nutshell, our argument is the following. First, as perceived by humans, the social world is complex (although we consider the claim that the social world is more complex than the physical one to be empty, as long as there is no common metric for measuring environmental complexity). Second, this complexity creates conditions under which optimization is either impossible or inflicts a computational utility? Despite its breathtaking speed, Deep Blue would need some 55,000 billion years to think ten moves by each party ahead-which would not even get it to the end of a typical chess game-in order to pick the best first move (Gigerenzer, 2007) . Chess is thus computationally intractable: No large brain or existing machine can find the best (optimal) strategy, even if such a strategy exists.
Relative to real social interaction, chess is a piece of cake. In social interaction, the rules are not necessarily well defined, and players may even renegotiate them depending on how they fare. Moreover, the set of possible actions is vast. Just consider the myriad strategies a child may adopt to prevail in a conflict with a sibling: tell the truth, lie, pacify, accuse, threaten, insult, capitulate, form an alliance, withdraw, throw a tantrum, fight, and so forth. Although the "father" of bounded rationality, Herbert Simon, stressed that the human mind "must use approximate methods to handle most tasks" because of its limitations (1990a, p. 6), we do not use heuristics only because of these limitations.
Heuristics are often the only recourse when real-world social decision-making problems become computationally intractable, as almost every interesting problem in artificial intelligence is known to be (Reddy, 1988 Greenspan's predicament-are likely to compete with others, making optimization an even greater burden.
Parental investment aptly illustrates the dilemma of having competing goals that make optimization even more difficult. One goal espoused by parents in egalitarian societies is fairness, usually interpreted to mean equal distribution of resources among one's children. The equity heuristic, which aims to realize this goal within any given period in the children's development, coincides with the prescription of optimization models in economics and biology in cases in which the expected future "return" on parental investment in each offspring is equal. Yet there is an inevitable downside to this strategy for fairness: Whereas an equity motive produces a fair distribution at any given point in time, it can yield (under plausible assumptions, such as the finiteness of parental resources) an unequal cumulative distribution of investments (for details, see chapter 17). For illustration, consider the allocation of parents' time. Although the heuristic We agree with those who have argued that the social world as perceived by humans can be complex. If chess is computationally intractable, "social chess" is even more so. We ardently disagree, however, with the argument that environmental complexity requires cognitive complexity and therefore makes simple heuristics descriptively and normatively inappropriate models of human cognition in social environments. This argument reflects deeply entrenched intuitions held by many scholars of the mind: The more complex a problem, the more complex the problem solver's cognitive machinery must be to solve it (see Hertwig & Todd, 2003) , and the more complex the problem solver's behavior, (1954) , the father of modern Bayesian decision theory, large worlds, unlike small worlds, are situations in which one can no longer assume that optimization is possible or that classical models of rationality automatically give a correct answer. In large worlds, the mind cannot help but invoke the humbler competences of a "parts dealer and crafty backwoods mechanic, constantly fixing and redesigning old machines and fashioning new ones out of whatever comes easily to hand" (p. 10), as Wimsatt (2007) described the essence of nature and evolutionary change.
As crafty backwoods mechanics in the social wild, we cannot pretend to be universal, elegant, context-free problem solvers. Instead, as proposed in this book, we rely on simple, versatile heuristics. Like a mechanic, we can repurpose these mental tools and deploy them in new contexts. Admittedly, backwoods scissors whose blades are the structure of task environments and the computational capabilities of the actor" (p. 7). By looking at only one of the two blades-that is, the cognitive "software"-one cannot hope to understand why and when a system works. In research on simple, ecologically rational heuristics, considerable progress has been made in identifying environmental structures that are associated with heuristics' success or lack thereof (e.g., Hogarth & Karelaia, 2005 , 2006 , 2007 Martignon & Hoffrage, 1999 , 2002 Todd et al., 2012) . Although most of these analyses have focused on structures in nonsocial environments, at least three of the key environmental properties identified cut across social and nonsocial environments and thus are likely to have put selective pressure on cognitive adaptations in both types of domains (see Todd et al., 2005) . These properties are:
Uncertainty. The degree of uncertainty captures how well a target criterion (e.g., the probability of precipitation tomorrow, or a predator's next move) can be predicted. The greater the unpredictability of the criterion, the more effectively simple heuristics can compete with or even outperform optimization methods in competitions where the criterion can be inferred on the basis of probabilistic cues (e.g., DeMiguel, Garlappi, & Uppal, 2009; Todd et al., 2012) . Ignoring some available information and forgoing complex computation -that is, simplifying-enables the mind to master volatility and uncertainty. This finding clashes with the aforementioned intuition according to which complex social environments necessitate application of complex algorithms. Whiten and Byrne (1988, p. 8) , for instance, singled out the predictability, or rather the relative unpredictability, of social criteria (e.g., others' future behavior) as the culprit behind social environments' presumed higher complexity (but see Gigerenzer, 1997 have not yet been observed or are otherwise unknown. Fitting, in contrast, occurs when a model's parameters are chosen so that they maximize the fit between the model's predictions and outcomes that are already known.
Humans, animals, and forecasting techniques (for instance, for predicting weather conditions and consumer demand) typically need to predict the future rather than fit the known past and present. In fitting, the more adjustable parameters a model has, the better the model's fit is. In prediction, however, too few or too many parameters can compromise performance (Pitt, Myung, & Zhang, 2002) . This is because, when predicting the future (e.g., how successful a particular child will be in college), a model's adjustable parameters need to be estimated from available data, and the quality of the estimates depends on how large and reliable the data samples are. On one hand, if the sample size is modest, then the deviation between the model's predictions and the true state of nature attributable to variance (sampling error) is likely to be large and will increase with the number of parameters to be estimated. Consequently, a model with many parameters will not generalize well to new situations; that is, it will not be robust. On the other hand, if a model has too few parameters, then the risk is that its bias (lack of flexibility) will drive a wedge between the model's predictions and the true state of heuristic, which ignores all previous data, has only one parameter, N (i.e., the number of investment options), which is determined solely by the investment environment.
Notwithstanding the 1/N heuristic's simplicity, none of the complex optimizing models was able to outperform it consistently on established measures of financial performance.
To have a fighting chance against the simple heuristic, the optimizing models would have needed much larger samples of stock data-by DeMiguel et al.'s reckoning assuming 50 investment options, 500 years' worth.
Small data samples are likely to be ubiquitous in social and nonsocial environments alike. One crucial reason is that individual learning in both types of environments can be extremely risky. Consider, for instance, cab drivers who must decide whether to pick up a fare. In some cities, misjudging a prospective passenger's trustworthiness can be deadly. According to Gambetta and Hamill (2005) , for example, "in the United States a taxi driver is 60 times more likely to be murdered on the job than the average worker," and taxi drivers fall "victim to more deadly violent assaults (184 per 1,000) than any other occupation with the exception of police" (p. 1). For novice cab drivers, learning from scratch More generally, social learning heuristics are a class of simple strategies about whose ecological rationality we know a lot.
Various researchers (e.g., Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Henrich & Boyd, 1998; Kameda & Nakanishi, 2003; McElreath et al., 2005; Rogers, 1988; Sirot, 2001 ; for reviews, see Kendal et al. 2009; Laland, 2004; Rieucau & Giraldeau, 2011 ; see also chapter 14) have proposed formal models specifying appropriate contexts for social learning through imitation, including environments where:
1. The costs of acquiring personal information (e.g., via trial-and-error learning) are extremely high, such as when direct interaction with the physical or social environment can expose the individual to injury and predation risks (recall (p.25) the cab drivers) or when opportunity costs (in lost time and energy) become prohibitively high.
2. Frequent temporal or spatial changes in the environment rob past data of their predictive value (see also the "Uncertainty" section above).
3. Individuals lack relevant prior knowledge (see also the "Sample Size" section above) or are uncertain as to which of several possible behavioral strategies is the most appropriate in the light of available information. given environment increases, making it more adaptive to learn from others.
Analytical work on social-learning heuristics (including computer tournaments; Rendell et al., 2010) can provide a blueprint for analyzing other important classes of heuristics and environmental properties that determine their success in the social world. Beyond the structures reviewed here, there are many other environmental structures, contexts, and circumstances that are likely to be relevant for understanding the successes and failures of a simple heuristic in a social environment (see chapters 3, 7, 9, 11, and 18). We expect time pressure, for instance, to be a key condition under which good performance requires use of simple heuristics (Rieskamp & Hoffrage, 2008) . Remember the many times at the family dinner table when your mother asked who would like to have, say, the last scoop of ice cream. As we all learned quickly, and sometimes the hard way, there is no time under such circumstances to ponder the alternatives, weighing and adding their costs and benefits. Similarly, many other social decision-making situations-which seat to take in a bus, how to respond to questions in a job interview, whether to approach an attractive person in a bar-require split-second decisions because the environment, made up of other agents and their behavior, changes constantly.
The study of ecological rationality in social environments is rendered all the more fascinating by the fact that the use of a heuristic can rapidly change the very social environment in which it is used, leading to co-evolution of heuristics and environments (Hutchinson, Fanselow, & Todd, 2012; Todd & Heuvelink, 2006; and chapter 8) . Moreover, a far-reaching implication of the ecological analyses and findings reviewed here is that models of heuristics are not only descriptive.
Especially in the large worlds (Savage, 1954) in which optimization is out of reach, they also give important insight into how people should behave given limited knowledge when navigating a complex, uncertain, and fast-paced social (p.26)
world (Gigerenzer & Todd, 2012) . In other words, these models have normative power.
Simple 
Exploitation of Evolved Capacities
The second key to the success of heuristics is that they can be masterful exploiters, taking advantage of evolved cognitive, visual, motoric, or other capacities of the mind and body. Evolved capacities represent the ability to do things that people do with ease, such as tracking a moving object against a noisy background (even babies are able to focus their gaze on a moving target and to track an occluded object in their "mind's eye"; see Rosander & von Hofsten, 2002; von Hofsten, Kochukhova, & Rosander, 2007) , but that robots or computer programs can do only at the expense of enormous computational complexity. Humans need not expend their precious and limited cognitive resources on such tasks, because evolved capacities are typically executed automatically.
Without evolved capacities, heuristics could neither do their job nor be as simple as they are. At the same time, without heuristics, evolved capacities alone could not solve inference, choice, and decision problems. inferences about objects based on whether they are recognized, and the speed with which they are recognized, respectively-take advantage of the evolved capacities for recognition memory (e.g., of faces and voices) and systematic forgetting (Schooler & Hertwig, 2005) . The simple tit-for-tat heuristic for making decisions in social exchange situations (see chapter 5)-cooperate first and then imitate your counterpart's last behavior (Axelrod, 1984; Rapoport & Chammah, 1965 )-takes advantage of several evolved capacities, including numerical discrimination (i.e., evaluating whether exchange was equitable), appropriate temporal discounting (i.e., because reciprocity involves paying an immediate cost for future benefits, the benefits must be timediscounted "appropriately for reciprocity to work"; Stevens & Hauser, 2004, p. 63) , and cheater detection (chapter 15).
Cheater detection, in turn, appears to capitalize on adaptive specializations for reasoning about social exchange (Cosmides, Barrett, & Tooby, 2010) . Heuristics can afford to be simple because they exploit evolved capacities.
PRINTED Evolved capacities represent abilities that can be dedicated to nonsocial domains (e.g., the ability to track an object's movement), social domains (e.g., the ability to feel empathy), or both (e.g., the ability to store and forget information). In our view, the existence of domain-specific capacities is one of the main reasons why dissociations between social and nonsocial cognitive processes can occur in disorders such as autism. Autism has been suggested as resulting (p.27) from the lack of, or delays in, the development of theory of mind, an evolved capacity dedicated to the social world (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985) . The existence of domainspecific evolved capacities and deficits therein does not imply, however, that there are two kinds of intelligence, one social and the other nonsocial, composed of qualitatively different cognitive processes. Heuristics that exploit evolved capacities are the common denominator across worlds.
To conclude, contrary to a suspicion still harbored by many social and cognitive psychologists, simplicity in cognitive mechanisms does not open the floodgates to irrationality (see Krueger & Funder, 2004) or to other horrors named (e.g., loss of money) and unnamed. Nor do heuristics capitulate in the face of complexity, uncertainty, scarcity of information, or time pressure. They are the indispensable tools that the mind -that parts dealer and crafty backwoods mechanic-can recruit to find solutions to intractable problems in a complex and uncertain world. By exploiting the evolved capacities that the mind has at hand, the heuristics can stay fast and frugal. They are not foolproof, though. They will lead to good-or at least satisficing (Simon, 1956 (Simon, , 1982 (Simon, , 1990a )-solutions to the extent that they are employed in the right environments. How people learn, individually and socially, to use heuristics in an adaptive way is one of the central questions for future research in this area (for a start, see Rieskamp & Otto, 2006 In social games, in contrast, how well a person fares does not depend on a dispassionate other such as nature, but on the decisions of other self-interested players. According to game theory, each player in a social game desires to maximize expected utility, where expectation is based on the probability distribution that represents the player's uncertainty about the other players' decisions (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944) .
The litmus test for the players' economic rationality is the Nash equilibrium condition: In equilibrium, each player makes decisions that are optimal given the equilibrium decisions of others, and no player has an incentive to change his strategy. Although games against nature and social games represent distinct domains, the aforementioned challenges that decision makers face-among them intractability, time pressure, information scarcity, and dynamically changing environmental circumstances-cut across the two types of domains, and simple heuristics offer solutions to problems in both types. This does not mean, however, that exactly the same heuristics will be employed to play both types of games, although some heuristics do travel between the domains. We propose that the adaptive toolbox encompasses at least four classes of heuristics, depending on whether they feed on social, nonsocial, or both kinds of information, and whether they can be employed in games against nature or social games, or both.
Social information is information concerning the state of a social being or a social system (e.g., behavior, intentions, morning, sailors take warning." Here red refers to the glow of the morning or evening sky caused by haze or clouds related to storms in the area. In Gujarat (India), farmers try to predict the monsoon's timing and character using an ancient and apparently reasonably accurate rule of thumb that predicts the monsoon will begin one-and-a-half months after the blooming of the Cassia fistula tree, a common species on roadsides in the region ("Folk Wisdom," 2001) . Modern weather forecasters "often develop rules of thumb to adjust the guidance produced by NWP (numerical weather prediction) models" as well (Hamill, 2003, p. 933) . That is, they use heuristics to handle the complex outcomes of highly sophisticated number-crunching forecast models. One example of such a heuristic in shorter-range forecasts is "d(prog)/dt."
By this rule of thumb, if the forecasts (of (p.30) a set of lagged forecasts from the same model) show a trend, "this trend is more likely than not to continue" (Hamil, 2003, p. 933) .
Heuristics That Can Travel Between Worlds
Heuristics in the second class shown in Figure 1 -1 (Panel B) are able to cross the border between games against nature and social games. Their versatility stems from their ability to work with both social and nonsocial information, and the criteria of interest may concern social or nonsocial entities.
Resource-allocation heuristics such as the 1/N heuristic, for example, are versatile enough to be employed in both worlds.
N can stand for the number of investment options (DeMiguel et al., 2009) , the number of players in the ultimatum game (Güth, Schmittberger, & Schwarze, 1982 ; chapters 2 and 6), or the number of children in a family (Hertwig et al., 2002) .
Another example of a heuristic in this class is the gaze heuristic (Gigerenzer, 2007), a rule of thumb that experienced ball players appear to use-not necessarily consciously-to catch a ball that is already high in the air:
Gaze heuristic: Fixate your gaze on the ball, start running, and adjust your running speed so that the angle of gaze (i.e., the angle between your eye and the ball, relative to the ground) remains constant.
It is worth noting that the task of predicting the trajectory of an airborne ball is, at least in theory, tremendously complex (Dawkins, 1989) , and using an optimization procedure would lead to a computational explosion that could not be handled in real time. A player who takes advantages of the gaze heuristic, however, can ignore the myriad causal variables (such as initial distance, velocity, angle, speed, wind, and spin) that would have to be gauged and integrated to compute the ball's trajectory. The heuristic exploits the fact that all the relevant information is captured by a single variable: the angle of gaze. Sailors and pilots use similar heuristics when trying to evade collisions, as do dogs trying to catch a Frisbee (the LOT heuristic; Shaffer, Krauchunas, Eddy, & McBeath, 2004) . Maintenance of the optical angle appears to be used not only in the interception of inanimate objects (games against nature), but also in the pursuit of prey (social games). Bats, birds, and dragonflies, for instance, have been found to maintain a constant optical angle between themselves and their prey (see Shaffer et al., 2004; chapter 15 (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996) . Taking social or nonsocial information as input, take-the-best infers which of two alternatives has a higher value on a criterion on the basis of binary cue values retrieved from memory. The criterion can be social or nonsocial in nature. It works as follows:
Take-the-best heuristic: Search through cues in order of their validity. Stop when the first cue that discriminates between the alternatives is found. Infer that the alternative with the positive cue value has the higher value on the criterion.
Take-the-best can be employed to predict the relative rainfall on two days from cues such as the percentage of cloud cover and types of clouds. Or it can predict the high school dropout rate in Chicago's public high schools from cues such as a school's percentage of students from low-income families and average Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) scores (Czerlinksi, Gigerenzer, & Goldstein, 1999) . The heuristic also describes how expert burglars decide which of two residential properties is safer for a burglary (Garcia-Retamero & Dhami, 2009 ) on the basis of, among other cues, social information such as whether the property is cared for and whether somebody seems to be at home (lights on or off, letterbox emptied or not).
Heuristics That Can Travel Across Worlds but Require Social Information
A third class of heuristics can be used in games against nature (e.g., finding routes to foraging sites) as well as social games (e.g., learning female mating preferences) but require specifically social input (Figure 1-1, Panel C) . Perhaps the most paradigmatic examples in this class are heuristics such as the imitation heuristics described earlier that acquire information from others, or copy the behavior of others, or both. But even when no one else is present, a person can benefit from social information-for instance, by calling up the memory of others' behavior in the same or similar situations or by consulting cultural memory (e.g., books, the Internet). & Sigmund, 1993; Wedekind & Milinski, 1996) . It highlights, however, that as mental tools heuristics are as integral to social intelligence as they are to the intelligence that is brought to bear in dealings with nature; or in Frith and Frith's (2010) words: "We should, perhaps, not be surprised that cognitive processes that have evolved for nonsocial purposes can readily be co-opted for social purposes by natural selection" (p. 742).
Intuitive Design
Identifying models of heuristics that can describe a wide variety of human decision making in social (and nonsocial) environments could easily be an end in itself, but it is more than that. Models of heuristics are meant to describe actual decision processes, not only observable outcomes. As such, they can inform social engineering aimed at improving decision making in important domains of life such as healthcare, law, and business, both at the process and at the outcome level. Optimization theories such as Bayesian expected utility maximization, cumulative prospect theory, and the inequity aversion model typically entail complex estimations and computations. One reasonable interpretation is therefore that these models are as-if models that capture behavioral outcomes, not the cognitive processes producing those outcomes. Nobel Prize laureate Milton Friedman (1953a) famously defended as-if theories in economics and beyond by arguing that a theory ought to be tested by the accuracy of its behavioral predictions and not by the "realism" of its almost certainly false assumptions (e.g., the assumption that economic actors behave as if they were fully informed and unconstrained by capacity limits). That is, the causal mechanisms that actually govern behavior lie outside the realm with which Friedman's advocated approach, known as positive economics, is concerned.
We agree with those who think that Friedman got it wrong (see Boylan & O'Gorman, 1995) . By giving up on the study of causal processes, Friedman abandoned an important lever of control in efforts to engineer processes and environments in ways that change decision making for the better. Intuitive design (Gigerenzer et al., 2011, p. xix) describes the explicit goal of using what we know about heuristic decision making (bounded rationality) and about the match between mind and environment (ecological rationality) to improve public welfare.
The cliché opening sentence in articles on human decision making is that each of us makes thousands of decisions every decision. The fact that accepting a default requires no effort may explain some of its appeal. Another consideration, however, is that decision makers appear to understand defaults as a communicative act by which policymakers convey a recommended course of action (McKenzie et al., 2006) . The default heuristic thus epitomizes a case in which, following the "Simon's scissors" principle, behavior is jointly determined by the mind (the heuristic) and the environment (the policy default).
Policymakers can take advantage of reliance on the default heuristic to foster public goods (e.g., organ donation; see chapter 17 and Johnson & Goldstein, 2003) or desirable behavior such as the public's use of renewable energy. In Schönau, Germany, 99% of households have stuck with the town's default option of using "green" electricity, even though the public referendum to adopt this default was supported by only a small margin (52% of residents in favor versus 48% against, with 90% of voters participating; Pichert & Katsikopoulos, 2008) . Heuristics that involve copying others' behavior can also be used to promote environmentally friendly behavior. In a study conducted in an actual hotel, the (accurate) message that a large majority of the hotel's guests chose to reuse their towels prompted more other guests to follow suit than did a message focusing guests' attention on the importance of environmental protection and towel reuse without mentioning what most other guests do (Goldstein et al., 2008) .
Information about what others do is increasingly widespread. Internet retailers such as Amazon tell customers who view a specific item what other customers who bought this item also bought. But this is just the beginning. With the rapidly emerging "internet of things" (Fleisch, 2010) and "ubiquitous computing" (Greenfield, 2006)-the notion that virtually every physical thing in the world, from clothes to shower stalls, can feature tiny and inexpensive low-end computers and thus become sites of processing-we are experiencing a feedback revolution. For instance, with "smart" power outlets and meter-based applications on mobile phones, people are already able to receive real-time feedback on their energy We believe that intuitive design represents an opportunity for psychologists and, more generally, scholars of the science of heuristics to participate in the engineering of environments and heuristic-and-environment interactions for the benefit of individuals and society as a whole.
Summary of Our Vision of Social Rationality
This book is about simple heuristics for making decisions in a social world: how they work, and when and why they succeed or fail. We show how simple heuristics can be an essential tool for navigating the complexities and vagaries of social environments. These heuristics are descriptive models of organisms' behavior under the real-world constraints of limited time, computational capacity, and knowledge. Their impressive performance poses a normative challenge for models based on complex calculations and, we hope, will spur a debate on the nature of social rationality. The research program presented here can be summarized by the following theses:
1. As perceived by the human mind, the social world (Umwelt) is complex, but not necessarily more complex than the nonsocial world.
2. However complex the social world may be, its complexity does not require cognitive complexity; rather, it entails conditions that make simple heuristics indispensable, such as intractability, multiple competing goals, and incommensurable reasons.
